What Would a Trump II Taiwan Policy Look Like?

Some political observers in the U.S. believe that Donald Trump, the Republican presidential nominee, has essentially adopted a negative, oppositional attitude toward Taiwan in recent months. “Trump Is Giving Taiwan the Ukraine Treatment” ran the headline in Foreign Policy in late July after Trump gave an interview in which he charged that Taiwan “doesn’t give us anything” and has taken “about 100 percent of our chip business.” He said that Taiwan “should pay us for [its] defense” and refused to voice an unequivocal commitment that America would defend Taiwan if the island were attacked or invaded by land China.

Coming in the wake of the Republican policy platform adopted in mid-July, which did not include a specific statement regarding the fate of Taiwan, critics of Trump (and even some supporters and loyalists) voiced worry that his commitment to Taiwan may have weakened in recent months. The party platform’s silence on Taiwan represented a notable departure from previous platforms, which explicitly announced that a Trump administration would come to the aid of Taiwan if anything threatened to change in its present status.

Why the change? Even if Taiwan is not going to receive “the Ukraine treatment,” is a Trump presidency going to give the island “the Hong Kong treatment,” leaving it to the mercy of Beijing? In late April, just weeks before Trump’s statements on Taiwan, Nikkei Asia reported that Asia experts predict that a land invasion or violation of Taiwan territorial space will occur no later than 2027—that is, during the term of the next American president. Such reports have heightened fears about Trump’s interview remarks. 

It warrants emphasis, however, that even though Trump’s critics have been proclaiming that he is set to abandon Taiwan and turn the island over to the Chinese Communist Party, other explanations are equally or more plausible. 

First, Trump has always taken what is described as a “transactional” approach to foreign policy. Trump is above all a businessman who casts himself explicitly as a dealmaker. That view is the essential foundation of his “America First” foreign policy. From this vantage point, he is not “abandoning” Taiwan, but rather recalibrating the relationship. He wants Taiwan to pay more for American help as well as to loosen its hold on its microchip monopoly. 

Trump’s transactional approach to Taiwan is at odds with the convictions of the China hawks who had counseled him during his first administration, such as National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. The middle ranks were also dominated by hawkish advisors (and strong advocates for Taiwan), such as Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger; Randall Schriver, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, and Peter Navarro, head of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy.

Here is the second reason why it is premature to jump to conclusions that Trump is “abandoning” Taiwan. In the last four years, Trump has increasingly insisted on “being his own man” on foreign policy and surrounding himself with advisors who fully support his “America First” outlook. The policy statements on Taiwan in the first two Republican Party platforms were shaped by his advisors, particularly China hawks. His present position seems much closer to the “strategic ambiguity” position historically favored by many, if not most, American policymakers. Trump acknowledged as much when he was asked what he would specifically do in the event of a hostile move by land China toward Taiwan. 

“I wouldn’t want to give away any negotiating abilities by giving information like that to any reporter,” he replied.

Third, any comparisons between Trump’s attitude toward Ukraine and Taiwan are misconceived. The U.S. has not poured hundreds of billions of dollars into Taiwan, nor is the U.S. propping up a war for which the U.S. pays with comparatively support financially from Europe. Likewise, Ukraine has not traditionally been an important U.S. ally, nor has it held for many decades a critical strategic interest geopolitically for the U.S. Trump, therefore, is not “giving Taiwan the Ukraine treatment,” but rather insisting that he will no longer turn a blind eye toward what he considers a long-standing “Taiwan First” policy in which—as he sees it—the U.S. has supported Taiwan without sufficient consideration for American economic interests. Indeed, if anything, Trump’s position on Ukraine would suggest that he strongly supports Taiwan. “We need to bring this [war] to a rapid close,” he has said about the Ukraine-Russia conflict, “so America can focus on the real issue, which is China.”

Supporters of Trump’s “recalibration” on Taiwan note that, from the beginning to the end of his presidential administration, he demonstrated both symbolically and by concrete action how he will likely behave if he regains power. For instance, just as he was about to take office, president-elect Trump made an unprecedented, widely reported phone call in December 2016 to the newly elected president of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen, the first time in 37 years that an American president (or president-elect) had spoken with the Taiwanese president. Trump cultivated close relations with Taiwan throughout his administration, and at the end of his presidency, in October 2020, he arranged a large arms sale of $1.8 billion to Taiwan, including high-technology missile and launcher systems. That same week, China retaliated by imposing severe sanctions on U.S. arms manufacturers, such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing, in order to pressure Trump to reverse course and cancel the proposed weapons sale to Taiwan. Not only did he refuse to do so, he went even further in the weeks that followed, canceling all restrictions on direct communication with Taiwan.

The people of Taiwan have long been strong supporters of Donald Trump—and vice versa, as his phone call to President Tsai before taking office evinced, along with his decision four years later to lift all barriers on official communication with Taiwan (which have since been reinstated by the Biden administration).

Having lived in Taiwan, lectured at the National Academy of the Humanities in Taipei, and taught foreign languages in one of the leading universities there—in Tunghai, the third largest city of Taiwan—I have long been struck by the overwhelming enthusiasm of most citizens of the island for Trump. This occurs even at the universities and among other elites. In the U.S., you will not find a department in the liberal arts at any major university that is not intensely hostile to Trump, giving him no more than 5 or 10 percent support. In Taiwan, it is exactly the opposite: A majority of the citizenry voices support for Trump. Obviously, this has to do with his frank and frequent criticism of land China—but also his willingness to take daring risks, as both the phone call to President Tsai and the large weapons package in 2020 demonstrated. 

That solid relationship between Trump and Taiwan has not dissolved in the wake of a mere interview in which Trump voiced a few critical comments about U.S.-Taiwanese relations. In fact, his selection of Senator J.D. Vance of Ohio as his vice presidential running mate—who is another vocal critic of China and a sympathetic supporter of Taiwan—only serves to reinforce that relationship. Moreover, Trump’s advisors were quick to point out that Trump, when he made these casual comments during the July interview, was probably not fully informed about the fact that Taiwan is presently paying for most of its weapons imports from U.S. companies. Furthermore, they note, it was overlooked by his critics that Trump voiced strong admiration for the citizens of Taiwan in the interview. “I know the people [of Taiwan] very well, respect them greatly.” That was the context, he made clear, for his observations that Taiwan had taken “about 100 percent of our chip business”—he admired the enterprise of the Taiwan people. Still, he said, it was time to balance the relationship away from what I am calling America’s willingness to grant a “Taiwan First” policy. 

My own view is that the best indicator of Trump’s actions regarding Taiwan in a second presidential term is Trump’s record in his first term of office. Although his thinking is no longer dominated by a group of outspoken China critics, he res a vociferous critic of land China and an admirer of Taiwan and its people.