Western Policy in the Caucasus Is Backfiring

America’s foreign policy is backfiring again in a region with key geostrategic importance, the South Caucasus. This mountainous landscape is traditionally viewed in the Western hemisphere as the easternmost bastion of European civilization, on the frontiers of Asia and Europe, Islam and Christianity, a battleground for contesting powers such as Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, local states have regained their independence, and space has opened for their democratic development and integration into the free world. Georgia has emerged as an invaluable partner—an outpost so to speak—for Western foreign policy. This cooperation, however, is in jeopardy because of recent controversies in the West over Georgian legislation on “foreign agents” and cultural issues.

The core of this geopolitical impasse is a misunderstanding of Georgia’s relations to Russia and its place within the Euro-Atlantic sphere. The Georgian government is not pro-Russian. It doesn’t even have diplomatic ties to its northern neighbor and has condemned Russia’s aggression in Ukraine in every possible way. Indeed, Georgia is under partial Russian occupation since the deadly wars in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s, which effectively prevents any bilateral political cooperation or even dialogue between Tbilisi and Moscow. The governing Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 and has since proven to be a valuable and trustworthy partner of its American and European friends.

Georgia is committed to its North-Atlantic and European perspective. It was the Georgian Dream government, now under Western fire, that codified the country’s NATO and EU accession in the Georgian constitution in 2017. The government has been a forerunner among EU candidate states in fulfilling accession criteria. The EU-Georgia Association Council has welcomed the progress made with regards to human rights, freedom of expression, and gender equality. Georgia is a regional leader in anti-corruption measures, as evidenced by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, in which Georgia outpaced several EU member states. The Georgian state budget is the most transparent globally. The government has even changed the overpowered super-presidential system to a parliamentary democracy and has introduced a fully proportional parliamentary voting system in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission.

Georgia, however, can not change geography or overwrite history. It was under the Russian yoke for over two centuries. It is forced to tain pragmatic ties with its neighbors, especially when one of them is a nuclear power. Retaining trade ties with Russia is key to ensuring Georgia’s economic stability and energy security, especially when Georgia’s Western partners failed to provide alternatives to Georgia’s traditional export markets and the Caspian fossil fuels from Russia and Azerbaijan. Today, Turkey is Georgia’s largest and the Commonwealth of Independent States the second largest economic partner. Key development projects, such as the establishment of a deep seaport in Anaklia, are set to be carried out by China, and this is largely due to a lack of Western engagement and investment. Decoupling and deglobalization are major threats to the Georgian economy, which relies on pragmatic economic cooperation in Central Eurasia.

The reformation of power blocs in the international arena and the escalation of military conflicts in its neighborhood are existential threats for Georgia. It is an isolated country on the frontiers of great and emerging middle powers; it can not risk a major confrontation with its mighty neighbors, especially when its Western partners have failed to provide security guarantees since the Russo–Georgian War in 2008.

Many Georgians ask, “without the economic and defensive umbrella of the West, what is left of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic partnership?” They see that it all comes down to the American exports of liberal democracy, wokeism, and the culture war. Georgia is a very conservative society, one of the most religious Christian nations on earth, proud of its long history, ancient culture, and social values. Discourses that have traditionally been marginal, such as wokeism, are artificially generated by certain spheres of civic activism in Georgia. One example was Tbilisi Pride, financed by the American National Endowment for Democracy, the UN, and the Dutch government, which has caused public outrage in Georgia. Concerning same-sex relations, the Georgians have the most conservative public opinion in Europe, with 84 percent saying it is always wrong. This is one of the reasons why distrust towards NGOs in Georgia has increased from 17 to 32 percent since 2008.

Another reason why Georgian NGOs lose the trust of both the public and the state is their obvious dependence on foreign powers, both politically and financially. Some 90 percent of these organizations depend fully or partially on foreign—primarily European and American—aids, and, as the EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Georgia has warned, only half of them prepare annual financial declarations. A mere 26 percent publish them.

There are some 26,000 registered NGOs in Georgia—that’s one NGO for every 143 citizens in a country of 3.7 million people, an extremely high number by global standards. Neither the public nor the government knew for decades who pays these organizations or how they spend their money. There were some extreme examples uncovered that have raised serious concerns in Georgia, such as when an NGO offered a “DIY revolution workshop” with USAID money for opposition activists, inviting Serbian revolution experts to Georgia in 2023. This was one of the final straws that drove the Georgian Dream government to the conclusion that transparency needs to be established in civil society. The Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence—the so-called “Russian law” or “foreign agent law”—stands for a fundamental democratic value, transparency, but it has been condemned as anti-democratic. It is hardly comparable with the Russian legislation on foreign agents that has effectively curbed the operation of several NGOs, media outlets, and even individuals; the Georgian law merely imposes a one-off fine of some $9,000 on those organizations that receive more that 20 percent of their funds from abroad and refuse to register on the list of such organizations.

Another piece of legislation that has caused outrage in the West and resulted in renewed sanctions against Georgian officials is the law on “family values and the protection of minors” passed this September. It restates an existing ban on same-sex marriage and bans gender reassignment surgery, and opens the ground for outlawing Pride events and the public display of the rainbow flag and censoring books and movies with LGBTQ propaganda. This legislation is widely supported by the Georgian public and serves as the foremost argument in Western criticism of the Georgian government for media censorship and endangering freedom of expression. In retaliation, the EU Parliament has recently called on the Commission to freeze all the funds Georgia receives from Europe, while the U.S. imposed sanctions and visa restrictions on government officials. The sanctions regime, however, is destined to backfire. No U.S. or EU sanctions will ever change the Georgian government’s policy on defending Georgia’s sovereignty and conservative social values. Moreover, when Georgians find that their hard-earned candidacy for EU membership has been frozen by Germany, and that the U.S. has indefinitely postponed joint military drills with Georgia despite a looming Russian aggression in the post-Soviet space, they will lose whatever trust they have left for their future in the Euro-Atlantic bloc. It is time for decision-makers in Washington to remember the lessons of history, and how sanctions on Cuba, Iraq or Iran, has previously failed to achieve their ends and pushed real or imagined adversaries of the U.S. into the hands of the Soviet Union, post-Soviet Russia, and China. Let’s not make the same mistake in the South Caucasus.