John Jefferson
The departure of Bashar al-Assad from power in Syria has been met with a sense of jubilation in Washington, as politicians and pundits alike hail the development as a major setback for Iran. Little is said, however, about how Assad’s exit threatens to undermine what should be the United States’ overriding priority in the region: preventing the revival of the Salafi jihadism that res responsible for the worst ever foreign terrorist attack on the American homeland. By focusing on what Iran stands to lose, the case of Syria stands out as one of the most illuminating examples of how events in the Middle East are often viewed in Washington through Israel’s eyes, with little regard for American interests.
That the end of the Assad dynasty in Damascus constitutes a huge victory for Israel is not up for debate. Both Bashar and his father Hafez before him pursued a foreign policy in which Syria was the lynchpin of the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance.” In this role, Syria served as the transit route for Iranian weapons shipments bound for the Lebanese Hezbollah. Given how the latter proved to be the most effective fighting force against Israel (although badly battered in the recent conflict), the Assads came to be seen as a major enemy in the eyes of Israeli officials.
After attempts at delinking Assad from Iran failed, Israel became increasingly desperate to see regime change in Damascus, even if that meant the emergence of a neighboring state run by Al Qaeda–style Salafi-jihadis. This was plainly evident in statements made by Israeli officials following the eruption of the Syrian conflict in 2011.
In an interview with the Jerusalem Post, Michael Oren, the Israeli ambassador to Washington at the time, explained, “The initial message about the Syrian issue was that we always wanted [President] Bashar Assad to go, we always preferred the bad guys who weren’t backed by Iran to the bad guys who were backed by Iran.”
To make the message even clearer, Oren emphasized that this was the case even if it meant Al Qaeda taking over.
These statements appear to have been backed by action, as Syrian opposition activists revealed that the Israeli military had provided operational support to the Nusra Front, Al Qaeda’s official affiliate in Syria, which is today called Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). HTS led the offensive that forced Assad from power.
Prominent Israeli figures have even justified the provision of medical treatment to Nusra fighters by citing the fact that Al Qaeda had never attacked Israel. In an interview with Al Jazeera in 2016, former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy said that Israel had little reason to fear a potential blowback, as “Israel was not specifically targeted by Al Qaeda.”
Fast forward to today and a similar dynamic seems to have played out, with Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hailing the departure of Assad as historic, proudly declaring that Israel’s military operations against Hezbollah and Iran enabled the offensive ending the decades-long Alawite Baathist rule in Syria.
While Israel has good reason to prefer a Al Qaeda style leadership in Syria to one allied with Iran—not least because Al Qaeda has never attacked Israel, as Halevi stated—the same cannot be said of the United States.
Following the 9/11 attacks, Syria under Assad proved a willing partner in the Global War on Terror. So close was the cooperation between Washington and Damascus during this period that Syria became a common “extraordinary rendition” destination for individuals apprehended on suspicions related to terrorism.
The Syrian conflict demonstrated how when forced to choose, America’s preference was clearly for Assad over the Salafi-jihadis. Attempts by the Obama administration to prop up a moderate opposition led by the Free Syrian Army as an alternative to both Assad and the Nusra/ISIS Salafi-jihadi brand failed miserably, as the “moderates” defected to join the ranks of the extremists. According to a BBC report, national security officials in White House at the time were reluctant to provide armed support to opposition forces in Syria, citing fears of a terrorist takeover that they deemed a more dangerous scenario than Assad staying in power. Against this backdrop, Obama effectively gave up on the idea of regime change in Damascus, despite having earlier declared that Assad must step down. Defeating ISIS subsequently became the American priority in Syria, as Washington teamed up with the Kurdish forces in Syria to battle the organization.
Donald Trump was far more explicit in arguing that Assad in his eyes was the lesser of two evils when compared with jihadis. Speaking on the campaign trail in 2016, the current president-elect said, “I don’t like Assad at all, but Assad is killing ISIS. Russia is killing ISIS and Iran is killing ISIS.”
Trump’s policies during his first term also reflected an agenda in Syria that was solely focused on ISIS. After degrading the terror groups presence in the country in collaboration with the Kurdish allies, he considered his business finished in Syria, ordering a withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country (which was never completed).
The Biden administration for its part showed little enthusiasm for becoming deeply involved in Syria, let alone in regime change endeavors. According to recent media reports, the White House—in coordination with the UAE—was even considering rapprochement with Assad in exchange for the latter distancing himself from the Iranian-led axis of resistance.
Following the exit of Assad, American officials have adopted a notably cautious optimistic tone, warning that groups like ISIS may now see an opportunity to regroup.
“History shows how quickly moments of promise can descend into conflict and violence” said U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, warning that “ISIS will try to use this period to re-establish its capabilities, to create safe havens.”
Much is being said about how the leader of HTS, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, has publicly distanced himself from Al Qaeda and is adopting a minority-friendly approach. This offers little room for comfort however, as it may prove especially difficult for HTS to shake off its Salafi-jihadi roots. It is important to note that the Nusra Front—from which HTS emerged—was never a local Syrian movement that entered into a marriage of convenience with Al Qaeda. Rather, Jolani had been in Iraq and was sent by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, to Syria after the conflict started there. Jolani’s mission was to establish an Al Qaeda branch in Syria, which came to be known as the Nusra front. After a rift with ISIS, Jolani would go on to swear allegiance to Al Qaeda’s former leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, with whom direct communication lines were opened. Al Qaeda Central in Pakistan even sent fighters to Syria to join Al Nusra.
The evolving situation in Syria may prove to be the toughest test yet for U.S.-Israeli ties as Trump gears up for his second term. While the president elect has a staunch pro-Israeli record, his first term was also marked by references to the threat posed by “radical Islamic terrorism.” Should Syria slide towards a Salafi-jihadi regime, Trump may opt to take action, which may in turn cause a major rift with the Netanyahu government. Indeed, signs have already emerged hinting that the president elect is not in a celebratory mood over the events in Syria. According to the New York Times, Trump—along with his pick for national intelligence director, Tulsi Gabbard—is viewing the rise of HTS with concern.
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